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Leader Survival and Natural Disasters
ALEJANDRO QUIROZ FLORES AND ALASTAIR SMITH*
Analyses of the occurrence of natural disasters show that in large coalition systems, such as democracies,
their occurrence has little effect on protest or leader survival. However, if large numbers of people die in
these disasters, more protests occur and leader survival diminishes. In contrast, for leaders in small
coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters increases protests and reduces tenure, but the level of
fatalities has little effect. The anticipation of these potential political effects accounts for why many more
people die in disasters in small coalition systems than in large coalition systems.
Natural disasters such as earthquakes, ﬂoods and famines are deadly events that can kill
many thousands of people. While politicians cannot stop disasters from happening, they can
do much to mitigate their impact on society by choosing appropriate policies. Unfortunately,
these policies are not always pursued.1 Extant research shows that political institutions play a
major role in policy choice and in determining the death toll from natural disasters. We offer
a political survival explanation for these results by examining how disasters and their death
tolls affect the occurrence of anti-government protests and the (political) survival of leaders.
We use data from the Emergency Events Database EM-DAT to assess how the number
of disasters and the number of people killed in these disasters affect anti-government
demonstrations and political survival. Using a selectorate theory-based analysis, we found
striking differences in the political ramiﬁcations of disasters across different political systems.2
In political systems such as democracies, in which leaders require mass support to stay in ofﬁce,
the occurrence of disasters has little effect on either the level of anti-government demonstrations
or the survival of political leaders. However, consistent with predictions that leaders in large
coalition systems are accountable for good public policy, we found that democratic leaders are
highly sensitive to the level of casualties caused by these events. In large coalition systems, a
large death toll increases the level of protest against the government and hastens leader removal.
In autocratic systems this pattern is reversed. Since small coalition leaders stay in power by
providing their cronies with private goods, the provision of effective public goods is much
less important to their survival. Our analyses bare these predictions out. In autocratic
small coalition systems, the death toll from natural disasters has little discernible effect on
the level of protest or the survival of leaders. Accountability for good policy is relatively
unimportant in such systems. Yet disasters are not without consequences; they often lead to
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the concentration of disgruntled people into camps, which lowers the cost of coordinating
protests. Disasters can also damage the state’s repressive capacity. These factors mean that
although casualties have relatively little effect in small coalition systems, the occurrence of
disasters in such systems can be destabilizing, leading to protest and possible leader
replacement. The incentives implied by these results help explain why democratic leaders
make more effort than autocrats to prepare for and ameliorate the effects of natural disasters.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND DISASTERS
There is huge variance in the number of people killed by natural disasters. The severity of a
storm or earthquake is obviously partially responsible, but economic and political factors also
systematically affect the extent to which disasters harm society. Since Amartya Sen ﬁrst
argued that democracies experience fewer famines, research on the political economy of
disasters has concentrated on the relationship between political institutions and extreme
natural events.3 The consensus is that better institutions – broadly deﬁned – reduce disaster-
related casualties.4 In a seminal investigation of disaster deaths, Kahn demonstrated that
nations with high-quality institutions – deﬁned by level of democracy, income inequality,
ethnic fragmentation and good governance – suffer fewer deaths from natural events.5 This
result is robust to different measures of institutional quality. Anbarci, Escaleras and Register
focused on a system’s income inequality as a limit to the collective action necessary to ‘create
and enforce of building codes, retroﬁt structures, or enact quake-sensitive zoning’, among
other relevant policies that minimize casualties.6 Although Anbarci, Escaleras and Register
do not study the role of government, it can clearly play an important part in either promoting
collective action or implementing such policies, which have a signiﬁcant public goods
component. Stromberg found that government effectiveness – determined by the quality of
public services, infrastructure and civil service – and level of democracy are associated with
fewer disaster-related deaths.7 Raschky also showed that government stability and investment
climate reduce the number of victims and economic losses.8 Toya and Skidmore focused on
the effect of higher educational attainment, greater openness, more complete ﬁnancial
systems and smaller government; countries with these characteristics experience fewer
disaster-related deaths.9 Escaleras, Anbarci and Register found that public sector corruption
was positively related to earthquake deaths, while Cohen and Werker argued that
governments that derive utility from social welfare suffer less severe disasters.10
3 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983); Amartya Sen, ‘Public Action to Remedy Hunger’, Interdisciplinary Science
Reviews, 16 (1991), 324–36.
4 Cavallo and Noy, The Economics of Natural Disasters.
5 Kahn, ‘The Death Toll from Natural Disasters’, pp. 271–84.
6 Nejat Anbarci, Monica Escaleras and Charles A. Register, ‘Earthquake Fatalities: The Interaction of
Nature and Political Economy’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2005), 1907–33.
7 David Stromberg, ‘Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21 (2007), 199–222.
8 Paul A. Raschky, ‘Institutions and the Losses from Natural Disasters’, Natural Hazards and Earth
System Sciences, 8 (2008), 627–34.
9 Hideki Toya and Mark Skidmore, ‘Economic Development and the Impacts of Natural Disasters’,
Economics Letters, 94 (2007), 20–5.
10 Monica Escaleras, Nejat Anbarci and Charles A. Register, ‘Public Sector Corruption and Major
Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction’, Public Choice, 132 (2007), 209–30; Charles Cohen and
Eric D. Werker, ‘The Political Economy of ‘‘Natural’’ Disasters’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 52 (2008),
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One of the difﬁculties of studying disasters resides in ﬁnding comparable events – the
European heatwave of 2004 cannot be easily compared with the strength of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 or with the ﬂoods in Pakistan in 2010. Therefore, a growing proportion of
the literature on disasters has focused on earthquakes, as there are objective measures of their
magnitude.11 Moreover, although earthquakes often take place along tectonic plates, national
levels of income and political institutions vary along those plates, which makes them ideal
subjects of study. These investigations also concluded that political incentives to provide
public goods play an important role in minimizing earthquake-related deaths. These studies
have also contributed to the literature by exploring some of the dynamics of earthquakes and
their effects on population density. Since a signiﬁcant proportion of large earthquakes takes
place in isolated regions such as the Balleny Islands or in sparsely populated areas such as the
Kuril Islands, scholars include measures of population density as well as the magnitude and
depth of earthquakes.12 Consistent with earlier work, these analyses found that democracies
experience fewer casualties than non-democracies. The key question is why.
Information and accountability have been highlighted as key mechanisms in determining
government responses to disasters. According to Sen, ‘If governments were to be account-
able to the public, through elections, free news reporting and uncensored public criticism,
then they too would have good reasons to do their best to eradicate famine.’13 Likewise,
Besley and Burgess showed that state governments in India are more responsive to disasters
in areas where people have access to information and where electoral accountability is
greater.14 Information and news reporting have proven to be crucial in government responses
to natural disasters in the United States, as relief decisions are partly driven by news coverage
of disasters.15 Accountability is also important, as citizens often assign some responsibility
to leaders, as suggested by Achen and Bartels, who ‘ﬁnd that voters regularly punish
governments for acts of God, including droughts, ﬂoods, and shark attacks’.16 Both
Malhotra and Kuo, as well as Gasper and Reeves, also found that members of the American
electorate punish elected ofﬁcials for natural disasters at the local, state and federal levels.17
(F’note continued)
795–819. For a comprehensive review of the literature on the political economy of disasters, see Richard
Stuart Olson and Vincent T. Gawronski, ‘From Disaster Event to Political Crisis: A ‘‘5C1A’’ Framework
for Analysis’, International Studies Perspectives, 11 (2010), 205–21.
11 Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, ‘Earthquake Fatalities’, pp. 1907–33; Kahn, ‘The Death Toll from
Natural Disasters’, pp. 271–84; Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, ‘Public Sector Corruption and Major
Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction’, p. 209–30; Philip Keefer, Eric Neumayer and Thomas
Plu¨mper, Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper 5182, 2010).
12 Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, ‘Earthquake Fatalities’, pp. 1907–33; Kahn, ‘The Death Toll from
Natural Disasters’, p. 271–84; Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, ‘Public Sector Corruption and Major
Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction’, p. 209–30; Keefer, Neumayer and Plu¨mper, Earthquake
Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention.
13 Sen, ‘Public Action to Remedy Hunger’, p. 324–36.
14 Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess, ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory
and Evidence from India’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (2002), 1415–51.
15 Platt Rutherford, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington
D.C.: Island Press, 1999); Thomas Eisensee and David Stromberg, ‘News Droughts, News Floods, and
U.S. Disaster Relief’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2007), 693–728.
16 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection Electoral Responses to Drought Flu
and Shark Attacks (Princeton NJ: Mimeo, Princeton University, 2004).
17 Neil Malhotra and Alexander G. Kuo, ‘Emotions as Moderators of Information Cue Use Citizen
Attitudes Toward Hurricane Katrina’, American Politics Research, 37 (2009), 301–26; John T. Gasper and
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On the other hand, disasters also provide an opportunity for leaders to demonstrate their
competence and improve their electoral prospects.18 Olson and Gawronski argue that,
depending on leaders’ speciﬁc response to a disaster, it can have positive or negative effects
for the government in question.19
Political leaders are not above using disasters strategically to further their own political
goals.20 In a study of ﬂoods in Pakistan, Mustafa found that relief cheques were distributed
to political supporters and family members.21 Pelling argues that local elites can co-opt
community leaders to maintain control over, and perhaps proﬁt from, environmental
rehabilitation projects.22 Firms contracted to undertake disaster relief are also often
politically connected.23 In the United States, the president has unilateral control over the
declaration of disasters, which allows him to manipulate spending in strategic states.24
Garrett and Sobel, as well as Reeves, found that electorally important states in the United
States have a higher rate of disaster declaration.25 Within states, the distribution of disaster
aid is also politically driven, as Chen’s analyses of hurricanes in Florida show.26 Cohen and
Werker argue that governments spend less in politically weak or hostile regions, and that
nations expecting to receiving disaster aid can exacerbate the problem by underinvesting in
preparations or neglecting a population in order to attract (and steal) aid.27 On numerous
occasions, governments have actually used famines as political weapons.28
(F’note continued)
Andrew Reeves, ‘Make it Rain? Retrospection and the Attentive Electorate in the Context of Natural
Disasters’, American Journal of Political Science, 55 (2011), 340–55.
18 F. Glenn Abney and Larry B. Hill, ‘Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a
Hurricane on an Urban Election’, American Political Science Review, 60 (1966), 974–81; Jowei Chen, Are
Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off with Money? A Natural Experiment from the 2004 Florida Hurricane Season
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2008); Jowei Chen, When Do Government Beneﬁts Inﬂuence Voters’
Behavior? The Effect of FEMA Disaster Awards on US Presidential Votes (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, 2009); Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra, ‘Random Events Economic Losses and
Retrospective Voting: Implications for Democratic Competence’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science
5 (2010), p. 193–208; Andrew Reeves, ‘Political Disaster Unilateral Powers Electoral Incentives and
Presidential Disaster Declarations’, Journal of Politics, 73 (2011), 1–10.
19 Olson and Gawronski, ‘From Disaster Event to Political Crisis: A ‘‘5C1A’’ Framework for
Analysis’, p. 205–21.
20 Paul Brass, ‘The Political Uses of Crisis: The Bihar Famine of 1966–1967’, Journal of Asian Studies,
45 (1986), 245–67; J. M. Albala-Bertrand, Political Economy of Large Natural Disasters (Oxford UK:
Clarendon, 1993).
21 Daanish Mustafa, ‘Reinforcing Vulnerability? Disaster Relief Recovery and Response to the 2001
Flood in Rawalpindi, Pakistan’, Environmental Hazards, 5 (2003), 71–82.
22 Mark Pelling, ‘The Political Ecology of Food Hazard in Urban Guyana’, Geoforum, 30 (1999), 249–61.
23 Roger D. Congleton, ‘The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of
Catastrophe’, Public Choice, 127 (2006), 5–30.
24 Richard Sylves and Zoltan I. Buzas, ‘Presidential Disaster Declaration Decisions, 1953–2003: What
Inﬂuences Odds of Approval?’, State and Local Government Review, 39 (2007), 3–15.
25 Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel, ‘The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments’,
Economic Inquiry, 41 (2003), 496–509; Reeves, ‘Political Disaster Unilateral Powers Electoral Incentives
and Presidential Disaster Declarations’, p. 1–10.
26 Chen, Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off with Money?; Chen,When Do Government Beneﬁts Inﬂuence
Voters’ Behavior?
27 Cohen and Werker, ‘The Political Economy of ‘‘Natural’’ Disasters’, pp. 795–819; Raschky and
Schwindt, Aid Natural Disasters and the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
28 Michael H. Glantz, ‘Nine Fallacies of Natural Disaster: The Case of the Sahel’, Climatic Change,
1 (1977), 69–84; Edmond J. Keller, ‘Drought War and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea’,
Journal of Modern African Studies, 30 (1992), 609–24.
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Natural disasters also affect other political events. For instance, a number of studies have
found relationships between natural disasters and civil war.29 Our study is within this genre.
However rather than civil war, we examine how disasters affect political protest and leader
survival. The key result is that democratic leaders are highly sensitive to disaster-related
causalities, while autocrats are not. Given this result, it is perhaps not surprising that
democratic leaders do a better job of protecting people from disaster than autocrats.
SELECTORATE INSTITUTIONS, POLICY CHOICE AND SURVIVAL
Leaders cannot stop earthquakes and extreme weather conditions, but investing in
preventative and palliative measures can mitigate the effects of such events. Using
selectorate theory and, in particular, recent extensions of the theory that endogenize
revolutions, we examine the political incentives to mitigate the impact of disasters.30
Selectorate theory examines political institutions along two dimensions: the winning
coalition (W) and the selectorate (S). The winning coalition is the set of essential supporters
that the leader relies on to maintain power. The selectorate is the set of people from which a
leader forms her winning coalition. The sizes of winning coalitions and selectorates vary
greatly and shape political incentives. In democratic systems, the selectorate is typically all
adult citizens. The winning coalition is also large, with the exact size depending on electoral
rules. In elected monarchies or military juntas, selectorates and winning coalitions are much
smaller, and are typically restricted to aristocrats and senior military ﬁgures. The winning
coalition is also typically only a small proportion of the citizenry in an autocratic system,
although these systems often vary greatly in the size of their selectorates.
To stay in power, a leader needs to ensure that each of her essential supporters prefers to
retain her rather than back a political rival. The policies that most efﬁciently allow a leader
to buy the loyalty of her winning coalition depend on the size of the winning coalition. When
the coalition is small, the leader only needs to maintain the loyalty of a small number of
supporters, so she can most efﬁciently purchase their support by supplying them with private
goods. However as coalition size grows, rewarding supporters with private goods becomes
much less effective, as each person’s share of government resources becomes smaller. Hence
as the number of people that must be rewarded grows, leaders increasingly rely on policies
that provide a high proportion of public goods; this approach simultaneously rewards
all coalition members (as well as everyone else). Of course all policies contain aspects of
both private and public goods. For instance, in the context of disaster preparedness, the
government could fund the training of rescue workers and ﬁreﬁghters and stockpile
29 Kyle Beardsley and Brian McQuinn, ‘Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political
Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 53 (2009),
624–45; Dawn Brancati, ‘Political Aftershocks: The Impact of Earthquakes on Intrastate Conﬂict’,
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 51 (2007), 715–43; Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest
Sergenti, ‘Economic Shocks and Civil Conﬂict: An Instrumental Variables Approach’, Journal of Political
Economy, 112 (2004), 725–53; Philip Nel and Marjolein Righarts, ‘Natural Disasters and the Risk of
Violent Civil Conﬂict’, International Studies Quarterly, 52 (2008), 159–85; Idean Salehyan, ‘From Climate
Change to Conﬂict? No Consensus Yet’, Journal of Peace Research, 45 (2008), 315–26; Mariya Y.
Omelicheva, ‘Natural Disasters: Triggers of Political Instability?’, International Interactions, 37 (2011),
441–65.
30 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic
of Political Survival; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, ‘Political Survival and Endogenous
Institutional Change’, Comparative Political Studies, 42 (2009), 167–97; Alastair Smith, ‘The Perils of
Unearned Income’, Journal of Politics, 70 (2008), 780–93.
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emergency supplies. Alternatively, they might pay bureaucrats bloated salaries and buy
inappropriate or poorly serviced equipment from cronies. Both approaches generate some
protection for the public against disasters and create private beneﬁts for those who provide
the service. However, they clearly differ in focus. Leaders in large coalition systems have
political incentives to pursue a public goods-orientated set of policies that better insulates
citizens from disasters, while a small coalition leader is better protected by policies with
a private goods focus.
Of course a government’s ability to insulate its population from natural disasters is
not a perfect public good, and leaders might selectively provide assistance and prevention.
Yet the extent to which leaders can discriminate between people depends on the size of their
winning coalition. When the coalition is very small, leaders could allow large areas to ﬂood,
for instance, without jeopardizing the welfare of their cronies. However as a leader’s
essential supporters become more numerous, insulating them from disasters becomes more
difﬁcult without widescale prevention and relief programs. In large coalition systems, policy
competence – that is, the ability to deliver public goods – determines political survival.
Democratic leaders are motivated to protect and assist the people because they cannot
afford to appear incompetent. This is not to say that relief is evenly distributed in
democracies. As Chen shows, storm intensity accounts for only about 49 per cent of the
variance in disaster relief in Florida hurricanes; much of the rest depends on political
alignment and electoral turnout.31 However, leaders beholden to large swathes of the
population cannot afford to appear incapable of protecting the people or their supporters
will defect to someone who can. Political incentives determine disaster policy.
Survival Within the Selectorate Model
Political institutions determine the ease of political survival. There is always a plentiful
supply of political rivals that wishes to come to power. If members of the incumbent’s
coalition believe they would be better off under a rival’s leadership, they can defect and
depose the incumbent. Small coalition systems, particularly in the presence of a large
selectorate, make survival relatively easy, at least once a leader is well established.
Although a potential rival might offer a member of the current coalition more rewards
than they currently receive from the incumbent, the rival is inherently disadvantaged in
her ability to credibly promise private goods in the future. Once established in power a
new leader might, and often does, rearrange her coalition and replace some members of
the former leader’s coalition with those she likes more or thinks will be more loyal. Hence
supporters who defect to support a challenger risk losing access to future private goods
when the new leader reorganizes her coalition. An incumbent leader does not suffer from
this commitment problem, because she has already reorganized her coalition around
those with whom she has the greatest afﬁnity. Coalition members can therefore expect to
be included for as long as she is leader.
In small coalition systems in which private goods are particularly prominent, a leader’s
ability to commit to providing future private goods endows her with an incumbency
advantage once she is well established in ofﬁce. While there is also an incumbency advantage
in democracies, the incumbent’s advantage is not as strong because private goods are
relatively less important in large coalition systems.
31 Chen, Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off with Money?; Chen,When Do Government Beneﬁts Inﬂuence
Voters’ Behavior?
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Protests and Revolution
Revolutions are attempts by those outside the winning coalition to replace the
existing political institutions with more inclusive ones and are often preceded by mass
protests. Citizens have a greater incentive to protest in small coalition systems than
in large coalition systems, as the former provide few public goods. However, such
autocratic systems make it difﬁcult for citizens to coordinate and depose the extant regime
because communications and political freedoms are restricted. While someone might
be prepared to join an anti-government protest in a neighbouring town, they can not
express their discontent if they do not know the protest is taking place or if there is no
transport to get there. Natural disasters can serve as a coordinating device for citizens,
and governments, particularly small coalition ones, fear they may provide a rally point
for protest.
Disasters can facilitate coordination by concentrating those who are unhappy with the
current system and have little to lose, and thus pose a potential problem to political
leaders. In small coalition systems the people outside the coalition want to expand it.
While citizens can potentially reach this goal once they are organized into a mass
movement, autocratic governments make assembly and coordination difﬁcult, costly and
risky. In an argument ﬁrst advanced by Schelling, Kuran and others conceptualize mass
political movements as tipping points:32 if enough people participate, then it is hard for
the government to single them out for retaliation. Once events gain sufﬁcient momentum,
disgruntled people readily join them. However reaching this critical mass is difﬁcult, as
the initial participants expose themselves to government retaliation. Unless there is a
strong expectation that protests will succeed, few people are willing to initiate them.
Earthquakes and other disasters can serve as coordinating devices because they force
together large numbers of people, which makes it easier to reach the critical mass.
Disaster can also weaken the state’s capacity to monitor and punish.
Since natural disasters can facilitate revolutionary movements in small coalition
systems, leaders in such systems often try to prevent people from congregating. For
instance when Cyclone Nargis struck Burma in 2008, the military junta made no effort to
evacuate the people. Afterwards, survivors were prevented from seeking assistance in
larger towns and villages. Within a week of the disaster the army started forcibly
dispersing survivors from makeshift camps, schools and monasteries.33 By letting people
die in outlying areas, the government forestalled the possibility of protest. Dead people
cannot revolt.
The extent to which natural disasters serve as coordinating devices depends on where
they occur. Disasters that afﬂict the capital city or other densely populated urban areas
are more likely to stimulate protest than those in rural or remote areas. In general small
32 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978);
Mark Granovetter, ‘Threshold Models of Collective Behavior’, American Journal of Sociology, 83 (1978),
1420–43; Timur Kuran, ‘Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution’,
Public Choice, 61 (1989), 41–74; Suzanne Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The
Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany 1989–91’, World Politics, 47 (1994), 42–101; Pamela
Oliver, Gerald Marwell and Ruy Teixeira, ‘A Theory of the Critical Mass: Interdependence Group
Heterogeneity and the Production of Collective Action’, American Journal of Sociology, 94 (1985),
502–34; John Ginkel and Alastair Smith, ‘So You Say You Want a Revolution: A Game Theoretic
Explanation of Revolution in Repressive Regimes’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 43 (1999), 291–316;
Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
33 Emma Larkin, Everything is Broken: A Tale of Catastrophe in Burma (London: Penguin Press, 2010).
Leader Survival and Natural Disasters 827
coalition systems are not geared towards disaster relief, but they are more likely to
provide some assistance in urban areas than in remote areas. In China, the government
only half-heartedly assisted the remote province of Qinghai after an earthquake in 2010
and suffered few political consequences for its inaction. But when an earthquake hit
Sichuan in 2008, the Chinese government – wary of protest in this politically and
economically powerful centre – undertook relief operations that won the approval of
much of the international community.
PREDICTIONS
Political institutions shape disaster policies and how disasters affect leader survival. In
large coalition systems, political competition is based on the provision of public goods.
Small coalition leaders can more efﬁciently maintain power by buying off their small
number of supporters than by providing effective public policy. Large coalition leaders
spend more (and more effectively) to prevent and alleviate disasters than small coalition
leaders. This contrast leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: More people die in disasters in small coalition systems than in large
coalition systems.
In large coalition systems, politics focuses on the provision of public goods: leaders who
fail to effectively provide public goods are deposed. Protests against the government and
the survival of leaders are driven in part by how well leaders protect people from disasters.
Leaders cannot be expected to prevent earthquakes and extremes of weather, but the
people evaluate them on how well they prepare for these events and how effectively they
provide assistance. The survival of large coalition leaders in this context depends on how
well they deal with disasters, not on their actual occurrence.
HYPOTHESIS 2: In large coalition systems, in which the focus of political competition is
the provision of public goods, an increase in the number of deaths from
disasters leads to more anti-government demonstrations and decreased
leader survival.
HYPOTHESIS 3: In large coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters should have a
relatively small effect on protests and leader survival.
Private goods provision dominates small coalition politics. Leaders more effectively
buy the loyalty of their small number of supporters by retaining government resources to
reward them rather than by providing effective public policy. Resources spent insuring the
general public against disasters cannot be given to supporters. Although supporters might
be harmed by disasters, their relatively small number makes this unlikely, and it is easy for
the government to compensate them individually for their losses. Saving the masses from
disasters does not promote leader survival. Although the quality of a leader’s handling of
a disaster is not especially salient in small coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters
is because they serve as a coordination device for citizens to organize and protest against
the government.
HYPOTHESIS 4: In small coalition systems, disaster-related fatalities have little impact on
leader survival and protest.
HYPOTHESIS 5: In small coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters causes an increase
in anti-government demonstrations and a decline in leader survival.
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DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
We tested the predicted relationships between disasters and politics using data on the
occurrence and impact of disasters, political institutions, anti-government protests, leader
survival and many control variables. Data about disasters were drawn from the Emergency
Events Database EM-DAT at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED).34 This database contains information about the occurrence and characteristics of
more than 16,000 disasters around the world since 1900. According to CRED, a disaster is a
‘situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national or
international level for external assistance’. For the EM-DAT database, an event is considered
a disaster event if it caused the deaths of ten or more people, if 100 or more people were
affected, if an authority declared a state of emergency or if there is a call for international
assistance. When an event fulﬁlls any of these criteria, it is recorded at three different levels:
disaster level, country level and source level. In this framework, a unique identiﬁer is assigned
to each disaster, and each disaster can be associated with several countries affected by it. For
instance, the December 2004 tsunami has a unique identiﬁer, but it is recorded for thirteen
different countries. Disasters can be classiﬁed into groups, subgroups, types and subtypes.
There is also a classiﬁcation for primary disasters that caused associated disasters. CRED
also records the number of people killed, injured, left homeless and affected by the disasters,
as well as the economic damage of disasters in US dollars. Information about the occurrence
and effect of a disaster is obtained from several sources, such as the United Nations as well as
governmental and non-governmental agencies, among others. CRED ranks the reliability of
the information produced by these sources, and in the majority of cases a disaster is included
in the database only if two sources report the event in terms of casualties or people affected.
Once an event is included in the database, it goes through an internal validation process, and
is made available to the public once it is validated.
The ﬁrst part of our study focuses on the variable ln(Deaths), which is the natural
logarithm of the count of disaster deaths plus one for all disasters in a particular country-
year, and the variable Disasters, which is the count of disasters that takes place in a
particular country in a year. Unfortunately the EM-DAT database is still susceptible
to reporting biases, as some nations are much more likely to report events than others.35
In addition, the Disasters variable cannot distinguish between the scale of different
disasters. Such concerns have lead some scholars to focus on earthquakes, for which the
Richter scale offers an objective measure of intensity.36 Other studies use alternative
measures of disaster magnitudes. For example, Chen explores the effect of storm intensity
on disaster relief,37 while Healy and Malhotra use the Fujita scale to examine the effect of
economic losses from tornadoes on electoral outcomes.38
34 The database is available at http:// www.emdat.be/.
35 D. D. Hargitt Guha-Sapir and P. Hoyois, Thirty Years of Natural Disasters 1974–2003: The Numbers
(Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2004).
36 Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, ‘Earthquake Fatalities’, pp. 1907–33; Kahn, ‘The Death Toll from
Natural Disasters’, pp. 271–84; Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, ‘Public Sector Corruption and Major
Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction’, p. 209–30; Keefer, Neumayer and Plu¨mper, Earthquake
Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention.
37 Chen, Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off with Money?; Chen,When Do Government Beneﬁts Inﬂuence
Voters’ Behavior?
38 Healy and Neil Malhotra, ‘Random Events Economic Losses and Retrospective Voting’, pp. 193–208.
Leader Survival and Natural Disasters 829
However it is important to recognize that this ﬁx for one form of measurement error
introduces another type of measurement error. A focus on earthquakes, for instance, provides
an objective measure of the magnitude of disasters for a small subset of natural disasters.
Yet considering only earthquakes implicitly gives the magnitude of all other forms of disasters
a value of zero. Hence unless one believes that earthquakes generate political fallout but
storms do not, then an exclusive focus on earthquakes must be seen as a different trade-off in
dealing with noisy, poorly measured data rather than as a ﬁx. Reassuringly, we obtain similar
results when we examine only earthquakes.
To measure mass protests against the government we used a count of the number of anti-
government demonstrations per year obtained from Arthur S. Banks’s Cross National Time
Series Data Archive.39 Banks codes this variable as a peaceful public gathering of more than
100 people to express discontent based upon media reports. We operationalize this variable
as both a simple count of the number of protests (AntiGov) and as the natural logarithm of
this count variable plus one (ln(AntiGov)). Data on leader survival are obtained from
Archigos, a database of political leaders collected by Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza40 that
provides the dates for the entry and exit of political leaders and their age.
The selectorate institutions of winning coalition size (W) and selectorate size (S) are
obtained from Bueno de Mesquita et al.41 The estimate ofW is a composite index based on
institutional variables that reﬂect the openness of a political system. More speciﬁcally,
the measurement of the winning coalition is a composite index of Polity IV data on a
regime’s competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment and
competitiveness of participation. The composition of the winning coalition also includes
regime type as deﬁned by Banks’s Cross National Time Series Data Archive. Systems with
small winning coalitions resemble autocracies, whereas systems with large winning
coalitions are similar to democracies. The estimate of the selectorate (S) reﬂects the
selectiveness of a country’s legislature, which is a function of the breadth of the selectiveness
of the members of each country’s legislature and can be interpreted as a logarithmic scale of
the magnitude of a polity’s selectorate. This variable is also obtained from Polity IV data.
BothW and S have a minimum normalized value of 0, and a maximum of 1. As a practical
matter the democracies of Western Europe are all classiﬁed as having the largest coalition
size (W5 1). The next category of coalition size (W5 0.75) includes emerging democracies
such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The smallest coalition systems (W5 0) are generally
military regimes such as Pakistan following Musharraf’s coup in 1999. Middle Eastern
monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are generally coded as W5 0.25.
Measuring political institutions is a contentious topic. Much of the discipline has focused
on differentiating democracies from other political systems. An advantage of selectorate
theory is that it allows comparisons both within and across democracies and non-
democracies. Of course this is not the only approach to classifying non-democratic regimes.
Geddes, for instance, examines whether autocracies are military, personalist or single-party
in nature. Yet her typology does not directly relate to the theoretical ideas developed here.42
39 Available at http://www.databanksinternational.com/53.html.
40 H. E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza, ‘Introducing Archigos: A Data
Set of Political Leaders’, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (2009), 269–83.
41 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic
of Political Survival.
42 Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative
Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
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All measures have practical limitations, and assessing selectorate institutions is no exception.
Clarke and Stone and Morrow et al. debate, for instance, the close correlation between
measures of selectorate institutions and Polity IV’s measure of democracy.43 Given these
concerns, in the Appendix we replicate all results replacing measures ofW with Polity’s 210
to 110 measure of democracy-autocracy rescaled between 0 and 1, a variable we label
Demaut. These analyses produce similar results. However given the theoretical focus on
selectorate theory, we focus on the impact ofW on disasters and their political consequences.
Our analyses also use a number of additional variables related to economic and demo-
graphic conditions. The ln(GDPPC) is the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) in constant dollars. Growth is the annual change in GDPPC. The variable
ln(Population) measures a country’s population.44 These variables are taken from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. All data and programs to replicate the analyses are
available from the authors. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables.
Deaths from Disasters
Consistent with existing studies, our analyses showed that fewer people die in disasters in
large coalition systems, such as democracies, than in small coalition systems. Figure 1
shows the smoothed density plot of the number of disaster-related deaths in each nation-
year according to the size of the winning coalition.
Clearly, there are signiﬁcant differences in the mean and variance of these distributions.
Countries with large winning coalitions have a smaller mean number of deaths and a
smaller variance around this number, while countries with small winning coalitions have a
larger mean number of deaths and a much larger variance.
Motivated by these initial results, our ﬁrst set of estimations explored the role of
political institutions on the number of deaths caused by disasters. The unit of analysis for
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. N
ln(Deaths) 2.087 2.562 5,157
Anti-government demonstrations 0.572 1.921 5,069
ln(Anti-government demonstrations) 0.243 0.518 5,069
W 0.612 0.309 5,157
S 0.877 0.316 5,118
Disasters 2.408 5.832 5,157
ln(GDP per capita) 7.395 1.561 5,157
Economic growth 3.894 6.208 5,047
ln(Total population) 15.94 1.535 5,157
Leader age 56.891 11.257 5,003
43 Kevin A. Clarke and Randall Stone, ‘Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival’, American Political
Science Review, 102 (2008), 387–92; James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, RandolphM. Siverson and
Alastair Smith, ‘Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of
Democracy’, American Political Science Review, 102 (2008), 393–400; Monty G. Marshall, 2011 Polity IV
Project, Dataset User’s Manual, available at http://wwwsystemicpeaceorg/inscr/p4manualv2010pdf.
44 In our ideal speciﬁcation, we would like to use population density for each disaster. Since we explore all
types of disasters by country-year, we have not found the general equivalent of an earthquake’s epicenter;
national population density is not a feasible alternative because there is high variance in population density
within countries. However, our ongoing study of the effects of earthquakes addresses this issue.
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this set of models is the country-year. The dataset includes information on nations from
1900–2008. However, due to data restrictions on other variables, GDP in particular, our
sample for estimation will be smaller.
Table 2 presents estimates from a least squares regression of the natural logarithm of
the number of deaths plus one per nation-year.45 Political institutions, the number of
disasters, GDP per capita, population and their interactions with the size of the winning
coalition inﬂuence the number of disaster-related fatalities. Model 1 uses region-year ﬁxed
effects, while Model 2 uses country ﬁxed effects.46 As with all analyses, we report robust
standard errors clustered by either nation or region-year.
The estimates are consistent with the results produced by the literature on the effect
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Difference in Disaster Deaths by Institution
Fig. 1. Difference in disaster deaths by institution
45 In order to control for a potential reporting bias, we performed the same analysis when there was at
least one fatal disaster. The results are essentially the same. It is important to note that most empirical
analyses of disasters use a linear model to explore disaster-related casualties. Nevertheless, to address
potential concerns about the distribution of casualties, we estimated the same speciﬁcations using count
models; our analyses using these models also produce similar results.
46 The regions are given by the Correlates of War Project: Western Hemisphere, Europe, Africa,
Middle East, Asia, and Oceania.
47 Sen, ‘Public Action to Remedy Hunger’, p. 324–36; Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement
and Deprivation; Besley and Burgess, ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness’, pp. 1415–51;
Anbarci, Escaleras and Register, ‘Earthquake Fatalities’, pp. 1907–33; Kahn, ‘The Death Toll from Natural
Disasters’, pp. 271–84; Escaleras, Anbarci and Register, ‘Public Sector Corruption and Major Earthquakes’,
pp. 209–30; Stromberg, ‘Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid’, pp. 199–222;
Toya and Skidmore, ‘Economic Development and the Impacts of Natural Disasters’, pp. 20–5; Cohen and
Werker, ‘The Political Economy of ‘‘Natural’’ Disasters’, pp. 795–819; Raschky, ‘Institutions and the Losses
from Natural Disasters’, pp. 627–34; Cavallo and Noy, The Economics of Natural Disasters; Keefer,
Neumayer and Plu¨mper, Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention.
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In Model 1 the negative coefﬁcient estimate on coalition size and the interaction of
coalition size and wealth indicate that large coalition systems experience few deaths, and
that such systems convert societal resources into better protection against disasters than
do small coalition systems. The positive (but insigniﬁcant) parameter estimate in Model 1
on the wealth variable indicates that small coalition systems do not successfully use
increased societal resources to reduce citizens’ risk from natural disasters. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the theory’s predictions that large coalition leaders spend available
resources on public goods while small coalition leaders retain such resources for their
coalition rather than protecting their citizens. Although not shown, a similar pattern
observed in the analysis is repeated without ﬁxed effects: wealth reduces disaster-related
deaths in large, but not small, winning coalition systems.
Model 2 replicates the analysis using a ﬁxed effect for each nation. Unfortunately, since
there is relatively little institutional variation between nations, the estimates show a less
signiﬁcant pattern, which is a common problem when variables are relatively invariant within
the ﬁxed-effect grouping.48 As a robustness test we ran Plu¨mper and Troeger’s ﬁxed-effect
vector decomposition procedure, which accounts for the lack of temporal change within the
ﬁxed-effect units, and obtained similar results to those reported in Model 1:49 institutions
TABLE 2 Dependent Variable: ln(Deaths)


















FE 321 reg-years 150 countries
Unit: country-year.
*p, 0.10, yp, 0.01.
48 Neal Beck and Jonathan Katz, ‘Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green,
Kim, and Yoon’, International Organization, 55 (2001), 487–95; Donald P. Green, Soo Yeon Kim and
David H. Yoon, ‘Dirty Pool’, International Organization, 55 (2001), 441–68; Gary King, ‘Proper Nouns
and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data’, International
Organization, 55 (2001), 497–507.
49 Thomas Plu¨mper and Vera E. Troeger, ‘Efﬁcient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing
Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects’, Political Analysis, 15 (2007), 124–39.
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affect the number of casualties from natural disasters. Our next analyses delved into the
reasons for these institutionally induced differences by testing how the occurrence and impact
of disasters affect public protests and leader survival. The negative coefﬁcient estimate on
the interaction of coalition size and wealth indicates that large coalition systems experience
few deaths, and that such systems also convert societal resources into better protection
against disasters.
Anti-Government Protests and Disasters
We now turn to an examination of anti-government protests. In large coalition systems,
leaders impose few restrictions on free speech and the right of assembly. Protests thus
provide an easy means for citizens of democracies to express their dissatisfaction with
government performance. Joining a protest in a small coalition system is a much more risky
endeavor. Leaders in such nations restrict the right of assembly, and those who protest often
risk arrest, imprisonment or torture. Compared to citizens in large coalition systems, citizens
in small coalition systems have much greater cause to protest, but the costs and risks of
dissent are much higher. We argue that disasters affect protests in different ways across
political systems. In large coalition systems we expect that the occurrence of disasters will
have little effect on protests. However, the people will protest if the government performs
poorly – that is, if it lets a lot of people die. In contrast, the occurrence of protests in small
coalition systems is restricted by citizens’ ability to coordinate and organize rather than by
their satisfaction with the government. Disasters facilitate coordination, for example, by
concentrating disgruntled people in camps and potentially diminishing the government’s
repressive capacity. We predict that in small coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters is
more important in predicting protests than the government’s handling of the crisis.
These predictions are borne out by the analyses in Table 3. In Models 3 through 6,
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of protests plus one,
ln(Anti-Gov). Models 7 and 8 examine a direct count of the number of protests. Model 7
is a ﬁxed-effects negative binomial count model. The data exhibit a large number of cases
in which there are no protests recorded. To adjust for this skew, Model 8 estimates a zero
inﬂated negative binomial count model.50 In this framework a ﬁrst equation determines
whether any count is observed, and then the negative binomial is used for the positive
outcomes. In the model shown we included only coalition size in this ﬁrst equation.
The regression and count models approaches yield similar results.
There is strong temporal dependence in the number of protests; a high level of protests in
one year is a strong predictor of protests in the following year, as demonstrated by the highly
signiﬁcant parameter estimate on the lagged dependent variable. The models in Table 3
include variables for political institutions, the number of disasters in a year (Disasters) and
the number of disaster-related deaths (ln(Deaths)). The models also include controls for
GDP per capita, economic growth and population, and the interactions of these variables
with the size of the winning coalition, W. Models 3 and 4 include region-year ﬁxed effects,
while Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 have country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. We report robust standard
errors clustered by either nation or region-year.
Models 4 and 6 include lagged values of disasters and disaster deaths. These lagged
terms are included as well as the contemporaneous variables because it can often take
time for protests to take place and propagate. The need for lags is particularly pertinent if
50 William Greene, Econometric Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003).
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TABLE 3 Dependent Variable: Anti-Government Demonstrations
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
L.(ln)AntiGov 0.3252z 0.3245z 0.2198z 0.2166z
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
L.AntiGov 0.0967z 0.0910z
(0.022) (0.024)
W 20.5468 20.4147 0.7014 0.8003 7.9600z 7.4215z
(0.362) (0.389) (0.577) (0.611) (2.785) (2.875)
Disasters 0.0196y 0.0266y 0.0342z 0.0322z 0.0495y 0.0515y
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.021)
(Disasters)(W) 20.0208* 20.0247 20.0504z 20.0382y 20.0766y 20.0798y





ln(Deaths) 20.0002 20.0005 20.0100 20.0081 0.0425 0.0415
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.042) (0.042)
ln(Deaths)(W) 0.0120 0.0086 0.0227* 0.0165 20.0353 20.0346





GDPPC 0.0572z 0.0575z 0.0194 0.0318 0.0883 0.0649
(0.013) (0.013) (0.034) (0.034) (0.203) (0.208)
(GDPPC)(W) 20.0669z 20.0654z 20.0845z 20.0881z 20.6479z 20.6405z
(0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.156) (0.158)
ln(Population) 0.0170 0.0187 0.1518z 0.1495z 1.4871z 1.4876z
(0.014) (0.016) (0.043) (0.045) (0.244) (0.245)
ln(Population)(W) 0.0638z 0.0542y 20.0067 20.0130 20.2077 20.1867
(0.022) (0.024) (0.038) (0.040) (0.172) (0.175)
Growth 20.0035* 20.0025 20.0026 20.0020 20.0541y 20.0558y
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.026)
(Growth)(W) 20.0016 20.0037 20.0036 20.0052 0.0239 0.0262
























Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 20.5161y 20.5489* 22.3267z 22.3688z 225.5528z 225.1849z








N 4,918 4,854 4,918 4,854 4,918 4,918
FE 300 reg-years 300 reg-years 149 countries 148 countries 149 countries 149 countries
Unit: country-year.
























a disaster occurs late in the year. As mentioned before, the models in Table 3 also contain
all the disaster and death variables interacted with coalition size,W. Since coalition size is
coded between 0 and 1, the impact of deaths and disasters on the level of protest in the
smallest coalition systems is given by the non-interacted coefﬁcient estimates. In large
coalition systems the impact of disasters and deaths is given by the sum of the non-
interacted and interacted coefﬁcient estimates.
In small coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters leads to an increase in the level of
protest. For example, in Model 3 the coefﬁcient estimate for disasters is a signiﬁcant
0.0196, which implies that in the most autocratic systems the occurrence of disasters leads
to increased protest. Model 4, which examines effects in both the current and previous
periods, yields the same substantive conclusion. Although the coefﬁcient estimate for
lagged disasters is statistically insigniﬁcant, a joint hypothesis test that the sum of the
disaster and lagged disaster coefﬁcients is different from zero is highly signiﬁcant. Thus in
autocracy, each additional disaster increases the level of protest by about 2 per cent.
The occurrence of disasters has no signiﬁcant effect on the level of protest in democracies.
In the analysis the largest coalition systems are coded as W5 1. To evaluate the effect
of disasters in these systems we need to examine the coefﬁcient estimates on both the
disasters variable and its interaction with W. In Model 3, the sum of these coefﬁcients
is 0.019620.0208520.0012, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In the
Appendix we provide tables with hypotheses tests for the sum of coefﬁcients in each of
the models in Tables 3 and 4. An examination of the sum of estimated coefﬁcients for
the disasters variables and their interaction with W in the other models leads to the same
substantive conclusion: disasters produce a small but statistically signiﬁcant increase in the
likelihood of protest in small coalition systems but have no discernible effect in democracies.
When large numbers of people die in disasters, this is an indication that the government has
done a poor job of preparing for and responding to a natural disaster. In large coalition
systems such poor performance results in a signiﬁcant increase in the level of protest. Yet in
small coalition systems the level of disaster-related fatalities has no signiﬁcant effect on
protest. For instance, the coefﬁcient estimate for deaths in Model 3 is an insigniﬁcant
20.0002. Likewise in Model 4, a joint hypothesis test on the deaths variable and the lagged
deaths variable is indistinguishable from zero. In small coalition systems, the number of
deaths appears to have little impact on the level of protest. Protest in the wake of a large
number of disaster-related deaths is more likely in democracies. Assessing the impact of
disaster deaths for large coalition systems requires summing the deaths variable and its
interaction with W. In Model 3 this sum equals 0.0118, which is signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent
level in a one-tailed test. A similar effect is seen inModels 4, 5 and 6. Deaths have no effect on
the level of protest in autocracies, but lead to an increase in protest in democracies; a result
that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. However, the effects of disaster-related
fatalities estimated in the count models (7 and 8) are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
As predicted, the relationship between disasters and anti-government protests is highly
dependent on political institutions. In small winning coalitions the occurrence of disasters
leads to increased protest, but the number of disaster-related deaths has no signiﬁcant
effect. In large coalition systems, the level of fatalities – not the occurrence of disasters –
affects the level of protest. This pattern repeats in analyses of leader survival.51
51 As a robustness check, we included variables indicating the occurrence and intensity of civil war
(UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson,
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Leader Survival and Disasters
We explore the effect of disasters and disaster-related deaths on leaders’ tenures in ofﬁce
while controlling for population size, per capita income, economic growth, leader age and
the interaction of these terms with coalition size. The unit of analysis is the leader-year.
Although the Archigos database has information on about 3,020 leaders from 1800–2008,
the inclusion of economic indicators reduces the sample to the years 1961–2004. For the
estimation sample (1,111 leaders), median survival time is 2.6 years with a standard error
of 0.16 years and a 95 per cent conﬁdence interval of [2.30, 2.93] years. Table 4 presents
survival models. Positive coefﬁcients represent an increase in the hazard rate. Standard
errors clustered on the leader are presented below coefﬁcients.
Table 4 contains two forms of survival analysis. Models 9 and 10 are Cox proportional
hazard models. Models 11 and 12 use a Weibull parametric method in which the shape
parameter, r, is modelled as a function of coalition size. Each of the models supports the
same substantive conclusion. In small coalition systems, the occurrence of disasters leads
to an increased risk of leader removal. The number of deaths caused by these disasters has
no statistically signiﬁcant effect on leader survival in small coalition systems. The pattern
is different for large coalition leaders. Their survival is greatly endangered by disaster-
related deaths, but the actual occurrence of disasters appears to help them retain ofﬁce.
We start by examining the coefﬁcient estimates in the models. We then turn to technical
issues relating to the temporal dependence of the results and explain why we present
multiple estimation approaches.
Institutions affect the survival of leaders directly, and also by conditioning the effect
of other variables. Models 9–12 each contain coalition (W) and selectorate (S) size. As
predicted by selectorate theory, leaders survive longer when they form a coalition from a
large pool of potential supporters. The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient estimate on the
S variable supports this prediction. The impact of coalition size is more nuanced.
The coefﬁcient estimates onW are insigniﬁcant, butW signiﬁcantly modiﬁes the impact of
other variables. For instance, the parameter estimate on age is positive in each model,
indicating that old autocrats are at a greater risk of deposition than young autocrats. Age
is a less important factor in democratic leader survival. The coefﬁcient estimate on the age
variable interacted with W is signiﬁcant and negative. For democratic leaders, the impact
of age on survival is given by the sum of the age variable and its interaction with
W (0.0062 in Model 9). Democratic leaders are much less sensitive to age than autocrats,
which illustrates a common pattern throughout the analyses; coalition size modiﬁes the
impact of other variables. For instance, the signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient estimate of the
growth variable and the positive estimate on growth interacted with W indicate that
economic growth helps autocrats remain in ofﬁce more than democrats.
Disasters affect leader tenure. The positive signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates on the disasters
variable in Models 9 and 11 indicate that the occurrence of a disaster will jeopardize a small
coalition leader’s hold on ofﬁce. Models 10 and 12 examine the effect of disasters in both
the current and previous years. Joint hypothesis tests of the effects across these two years
show that disasters increase the risk to autocrats. In contrast, disasters – at least low casualty
ones – lower the risk of deposition in large coalition systems. Across the four models, the
(F’note continued)
Margareta Sollenberg and Hovard Strand, ‘Armed Conﬂict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace
Research, 39 (2002), 615–37. The results remained similar.
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TABLE 4 Dependent Variable: Tenure in Ofﬁce
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
W 20.0760 0.4599 20.8875 20.5991
(1.696) (1.767) (1.644) (1.709)
S 21.0410z 21.0503z 20.9114z 20.9045z
(0.161) (0.171) (0.165) (0.175)
Age 0.0382z 0.0378z 0.0455z 0.0452z
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
(Age)(W) 20.0320z 20.0297y 20.0451z 20.0429z
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Disasters 0.0386y 20.0038 0.0400z 20.0065
(0.016) (0.042) (0.014) (0.039)
(Disasters)(W) 20.0531y 0.0039 20.0546y 0.0063





ln(Deaths) 0.0082 0.0097 0.0086 0.0115
(0.037) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040)
ln(Deaths)(W) 0.0637 0.0371 0.0627 0.0367





GDPPC 20.1040 20.0792 20.0986 20.0747
(0.071) (0.073) (0.068) (0.069)
(GDPPC)(W) 0.1865y 0.1891y 0.1962y 0.2034y
(0.088) (0.090) (0.086) (0.088)
ln(Population) 20.0920 20.0977 20.1196* 20.1338*
(0.077) (0.082) (0.072) (0.076)
ln(Population)(W) 0.0874 0.0416 0.1272 0.0945
(0.104) (0.111) (0.101) (0.108)
Growth 20.0408z 20.0427z 20.0295z 20.0316z
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
(Growth)(W) 0.0390y 0.0329y 0.0229 0.0172








N 5,729 5,586 5,729 5,586
Subjects 1111 1075 1111 1075
LogLikelihood 26.19e103 25.88e103 21.71e103 21.61e103
Unit: leader-year.
*p, 0.10; yp, 0.05; zp, 0.01.
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sum of the estimates of the disasters variables and their interaction with W is negative and
generally statistically signiﬁcant. Disasters help democratic leaders stay in power, but imperil
autocrats. This result for democracies is consistent with prior evidence. Abney and Hill,
Chen, Healy and Malhotra, and Reeves have shown that US leaders can beneﬁt from the
opportunity to disperse beneﬁts and demonstrate competence in the aftermath of disasters;52
Olson and Gawronski also found evidence in favour of this hypothesis in their analysis of
several case studies around the world.53 The story is reversed when it comes to evaluating
disaster-related fatalities. The small statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate on the
deaths variable indicates that small coalition leaders are relatively immune to disaster-related
deaths. However the estimates of the interactions between W and the deaths variables are
larger, and joint hypothesis tests show that increased deaths impose a statistically signiﬁcant
threat to the tenure of large coalition leaders.
Figure 2 illustrates the substantive effects of disasters and deaths on the rate of leader
removal. The graph plots estimates of the hazard rate leaders face under different
conditions. The hazard rate at any point in time is the rate at which leaders are deposed,
and is conditional upon having survived to at least that point in time. The upper panel in
Figure 2 reﬂects the risks autocrats face (W5 0), while the lower panel plots the risks for
democratic leaders (W5 1). The estimates are constructed under the premise that S5 1,
leaders are aged 55 years, and per capita income and national size are that of the average
democracy, around $11,000 and 10 million people. The graphs plot the estimated hazard
calculated from Model 9 over ten years under different disaster contingencies. The solid
line in each panel assumes that no disasters occur. The dashed line plots the hazard if a
nation experiences ﬁve natural disasters and no casualties. Five disasters represents
approximately the 90th percentile in terms of the number of disasters per nation-year.
The ﬁnal dot-dash line plots the hazard a leader faces if his or her nation suffers 10,000
casualties and ﬁve natural disasters. Ten thousand is a high casualty ﬁgure that occurs in
about only 1 per cent of cases, even less in democracies (0.21 per cent).
The most obvious difference between the two panels of Figure 2 is that large coalition
leaders face a much higher risk of deposition than autocrats. A comparison of the solid
and dashed lines shows that the occurrence of ﬁve disasters increases the risk for autocrats
by about 20 per cent and decreases a democratic leader’s deposition risk by about 7 per
cent. Disasters help democratic leaders stay in ofﬁce, but only if they prevent people from
dying. Democratic leaders are highly susceptible to casualties. Figure 2 demonstrates that
the estimated hazard for leader removal nearly doubles if 10,000 people die in a
democracy. In contrast, fatalities hardly matter in autocracies: the dash-dotted line
reﬂecting high casualties is virtually indistinguishable from the zero casualty disasters case
shown by the dashed line. Although the effects are only plotted for Model 9, the other
models in Table 4 show similar substantive effects.
The occurrence of disasters imperils autocrats and helps democratic leaders stay in
ofﬁce. Democratic leaders are highly sensitive to disaster-related fatalities. Each of the
models in Table 4 supports this conclusion. We offer two forms of hazard analysis due to
52 Abney and Hill, ‘Natural Disasters as a Political Variable’, pp. 974–81; Chen, Are Poor Voters Easier
to Buy Off with Money?; Chen,When Do Government Beneﬁts Inﬂuence Voters’ Behavior?; Healy and Neil
Malhotra, ‘Random Events Economic Losses and Retrospective Voting’, pp. 193–208; Reeves, ‘Political
Disaster Unilateral Powers Electoral Incentives and Presidential Disaster Declarations’, pp. 1–10.
53 Olson and Gawronski, ‘From Disaster Event to Political Crisis: A ‘‘5C1A’’ Framework for
Analysis’, pp. 205–21.
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concerns about the proportionality assumption. The Cox proportional hazard model,
which is the work horse of survival analysis in the social sciences, assumes some common
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Fig. 2. Leader survival
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face the hazard h(t)5 h0(t)e
Xb, where Xb reﬂects the standard set of covariates and
coefﬁcients. Unfortunately, selectorate theory suggests how the underlying hazard varies
over time depends on institutions. In particular, small coalition leaders face a high initial
risk that declines over time, while large coalition leaders face a more constant threat to
their tenure. Hence theory suggests that the proportionality assumption of the Cox model
is violated; this conclusion is supported by statistical tests. A standard test of the
proportionality assumption is to generate residuals and correlate them with the logarithm
of time.54 These tests ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations in our data between the residuals
associated with covariates and time; the proportionality assumption is violated. What is
more, the pattern observed in these tests is consistent with that predicted by selectorate
theory. For instance, the residuals associated with the deaths variable are positively
correlated with time, while the residuals associated with the interaction of deaths and
W are negatively correlated with time. Further, if the analyses are performed on each size
of institution separately, then non-proportionality ceases to be a problem.
The non-proportional hazard model is a standard ﬁx when the proportionality
assumption is invalid. This approach interacts variables that fail the proportionality test
with the logarithm of time and re-estimates the Cox model with these interaction variables
added. Unfortunately, with the inclusion of many time interactions, convergence becomes an
issue. Some models will converge if the number of interactions is restricted. Further,
although Licht proposes useful graphical methods, examining the substantive impact of
variables in non-proportional models is difﬁcult.55 Therefore we instead used a parametric
approach that allows the hazard rate to vary differently according to institutions, as it is
theoretically expected to do. In particular we follow the approach of Bueno de Mesquita et
al. and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, and model the hazard rate as a Weibull model with
the ancillary parameter, which controls how the hazard varies over time, modelled as a
function of W.56
The Weibull model assumes that the hazard a leader faces at time t is h(t)5 l(lt)p21,
where l5 exp(Xb). The shape parameter p affects how this hazard changes over time.
Selectorate theory suggests that p is smaller in small coalition systems than in large ones.
Models 11 and 12 estimate the shape parameter ln(p) as a function of W. For a large
coalition system in which W5 1, the shape parameter p is indistinguishable from 1,
suggesting that the risk of leader removal is relatively constant over time. In contrast, the
risk of removal for a small coalition leader presents negative duration dependence, which
indicates that the rate at which these leaders are deposed decreases over time.
Central to our analysis, irrespective of whether we look at Cox models, non-
proportional models (discussed, but not shown here) or parametric models, the results
with respect to disasters are similar. Small coalition leaders are sensitive to the occurrence
of disasters, but their survival is unaffected by disaster-related fatalities. The opposite is
true in large coalitions: leader survival is highly sensitive to casualties, but the occurrence
of disasters weakly enhances leader survival.
54 See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, Event History Modeling. A Guide for Social
Scientists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 8 for detail.
55 Amanda Licht, Change Comes With Time: Interpreting Non-proportional Hazards in Event History
Analyses (Iowa City: Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, 2008).
56 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic
of Political Survival; Bruce Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, ‘Leader Survival Revolutions
and the Nature of Government Finance’, American Journal of Political Science, 54 (2010), 936–50.
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The analyses suggest powerful incentives for leaders. Depending on the institutional
setting, leaders should undertake very different levels of disaster preparedness and
remediation when disasters strike. If people die in disasters then democratic leaders are
likely to lose their jobs. It is therefore small wonder that they experience relatively few
casualties. The tenure of autocrats is less endangered by casualties. Given fewer incentives
to protect the people, it is perhaps not surprising that they do a worse job.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with prior work and many anecdotal accounts, our analyses show that fewer
people die from disasters in large coalition systems, such as democracies, than in more
autocratic small coalition systems. We contend that these differences result from how
political institutions shape survival incentives for political leaders. Using selectorate
theory as a model of political competition, we examined the incentives of political leaders
to insure their citizens against disasters.
In large coalition systems, leaders need to retain the support of a large portion of the
population. This incentivizes them to use public goods as a reward mechanism. In the
context of disasters this means taking steps to avoid them and minimizing their impact
when they happen. Given the large scale of their support base, it is difﬁcult for leaders to
exclude segments of the population from insurance against disasters without excluding
members of their coalition. For this reason, leaders invest in both preventative and
palliative measures to minimize the impact of disasters. Leaders cannot be expected to
prevent natural disasters, but they are judged on how they handle them if they occur.
In small coalition systems the incentive for leaders to protect citizens from disasters is
much less than in large coalition systems. Preparing for disasters and providing assistance in
their aftermath consumes resources. Leaders more effectively enhance their survival
by retaining these resources to buy the loyalty of their small coalition of supporters.
Humanitarian assistance is not good politics: focusing on the welfare of the essential few in
the coalition and ignoring the suffering of the masses is the most efﬁcient means of securing
political support in a small coalition system. Yet disasters can undermine a leader’s tenure in
ofﬁce, as they can serve as coordinating devices for protest movements. It is not a leader’s
poor handling of a crisis that gets him or her into trouble, but rather that disasters often
concentrate displaced people and enhance the ability of the disenfranchised to organize. As
we explore in ongoing research, this is particularly the case when a disaster strikes the capital
or other urban centre.
These predictions are supported by empirical tests. In large coalition systems the
occurrence of disasters has little effect on the level of protest or leader survival. However,
as predicted, leaders are sensitive to the number of fatalities. In small coalition systems,
the pattern of leader survival is reversed. The occurrence of disasters increases protest and
reduces leader survival, but the lethality of these events has no signiﬁcant effect. Political
motivations, not humanitarian concerns, drive governments’ responses to disasters.
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